Security and Privacy in Mobile Information and Communication Systems - First International ICST Conference, MobiSec 2009, Turin, Italy, June 3-5, 2009, Revised Selected Papers

von: Andreas U. Schmidt, Shiguo Lian (Eds.)

Springer-Verlag, 2009

ISBN: 9783642044342 , 298 Seiten

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Security and Privacy in Mobile Information and Communication Systems - First International ICST Conference, MobiSec 2009, Turin, Italy, June 3-5, 2009, Revised Selected Papers


 

Preface

5

Organization

7

Table of Contents

9

On Trust Evaluation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

11

Introduction

11

Related Work

12

Definition of Trust

13

Accuracy of Trust Evaluation

14

Estimation of a Node’s Capacities

14

Number of Observations Required

17

Trust and Network Connectivity

19

Connectivity of Trust-Based Networks

19

Validation

20

Conclusion

21

References

22

A Distributed Data Storage Scheme for Sensor Networks

24

Introduction

24

Proposed Data Partitioning Scheme

25

A Stronger Variation to the Protocol Modulo a Composite Number

29

Addressing the Data Partitions

30

Future Work and Other Applications

30

Conclusions

31

References

31

A Rich Client-Server Based Framework for Convenient Security and Management of Mobile Applications

33

Introduction

33

State of the Art

35

A Framework for Secured Applications

36

A Sample Scenario

36

The Use Case

38

The Authentication Services

38

Architecture of the Plaform

39

Risk Analysis

41

The Open and Secure Mobile System

42

OSMOSYS Client and Companion

42

OSMOSYS Server

42

Conclusion and Future Work

43

References

44

A Robust Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Protocol in VANET

45

Introduction

45

Security Requirements

47

SystemModel

48

Proposed Protocol

49

Setup

49

Registration

50

Multiple Anonymous Certificates Generation

50

Safety Message Authentication

51

OBU’s Real ID Trace

51

Discussion

51

Security

51

Efficiency

52

Conclusion

54

References

54

An Autonomous Attestation Token to Secure Mobile Agents in Disaster Response

56

Introduction

56

Trusted Computing

57

Mobile Agents

58

Related Work

59

Mobile Agent Security in Disaster-Relief Scenarios

59

Local Attestation

61

Operational Challenges

62

An Attestation Based Key Release Protocol

62

The AAT Hardware Architecture

64

Conclusion

65

References

66

An ECDLP-Based Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme Using Self-Certified Public Key System

68

Introduction

69

The Proposed Scheme

70

Registration

71

Proxy Share Generation

71

Proxy Signature Issuing without Revealing Proxy Shares

72

Proxy Signature Verification

72

Correctness of the Proposed Scheme

73

Security Analysis

74

Performance Evaluation

78

Conclusions

78

References

79

Building Efficient Integrity Measurement and Attestation for Mobile Phone Platforms

81

Introduction

81

Security Goals

83

Our Approach

84

Secure Boot

85

Secure Runtime

86

Putting Together: IntegrityMeasurement and Protection

89

Implementation

90

Related Work

91

Conclusion

91

References

92

Context-Aware Monitoring of Untrusted Mobile Applications

93

Introduction

93

Mobile Malware Defence

93

Execution Monitoring

94

Paper Structure

95

Modelling Application Behaviour

95

Approach Summary

95

Application Behaviour Modelling Language (ABML)

96

Demonstration

98

Existing Device Protection

98

Attacks and Countermeasures

98

Policy Compilation and Enforcement

101

Synthesising Monitors from ABML Specifications

101

ABML Policy Enforcement

102

Performance Analysis

103

Related Work

104

Conclusion

104

References

105

Extending the Belgian eID Technology with Mobile Security Functionality

107

Introduction

107

Belgian Electronic Identity Card Technology

108

Notations

109

Mobile Access to Secrets

109

Proxying the Belgian eID

112

Discussion

114

A Mobile and Secure e-mail Client

115

Requirements

115

Protocols

115

Evaluation

117

Conclusion

118

References

118

Filtering SPAM in P2PSIP Communities with Web of Trust

120

Introduction

120

A P2P SIP System

121

Trust in a Distributed System

123

Beyond the First Hop

124

Trusted Pathfinder Service

125

Implementation of the Pathfinder

126

Performance

128

Wotsap PGP Signature Data-Set

128

Measurements

129

Conclusion

130

References

130

Generating Random and Pseudorandom Sequences in Mobile Devices

132

Introduction

132

Requirements on Random Data

133

Qualitative Requirements

133

Quantitative Requirements

134

Randomness in Mobile Devices

135

Sources of Randomness in Mobile Devices

135

Secure Pseudorandom Numbers

138

Integration into Symbian OS

139

ANSI X9.31 PRNG

139

Fortuna PRNG

141

Conclusions and Future Work

142

References

143

A Context-Aware Security Framework for Next Generation Mobile Networks

144

Introduction

144

Related Work

145

Context-Aware Security Framework

146

Security Context

146

Security Actions

149

Context-Based Security Policies

150

Architectural Model

152

Conclusions

155

References

156

Information Reconciliation Using Reliability in Secret Key Agreement Scheme with ESPAR Antenna

158

Introduction

158

Secret Key Agreement Scheme Using ESPAR Antenna

159

Cascade Protocol

161

Cascade Using Reliability

162

Simulation Setting

165

System Model

165

Simulation Model

165

Simulation Results

166

The Number of Disclosed Bits

166

The Number of Communications

166

The Efficiency of Protocol

167

Conclusion

168

References

168

Protecting Privacy and Securing the Gathering of Location Proofs – The Secure Location Verification Proof Gathering Protocol

170

Introduction

170

Related Work

171

A System for the Secure Verification of Location Claims

172

System Model and Assumptions

172

Threat Model

173

The Role of the Verifier

173

The Use of Distance Bounding in the SLVPGP

174

The Secure Location Verification Proof Gathering Protocol (SLVPGP)

175

Protocol Outline

175

Protocol Discussion

176

Extending the Protocol

176

The SLVPGP: Extension 1

177

The SLVPGP: Extension 2

177

The SLVPGP: Extension 3

177

Overall Analysis

179

Cost Analysis

179

Security Analysis

179

Future Work

180

Conclusion

180

References

180

Providing Strong Security and High Privacy in Low-Cost RFID Networks

182

Introduction

182

The RFID Technology

182

A New Problematic

183

Privacy Threats

183

Related Works

184

Proposed Solution

185

A Few Assumptions

185

The Protocol

186

Security Evaluation

186

Security Analysis

186

Privacy Analysis

187

Conclusion

188

References

189

Safe, Fault Tolerant and Capture-Resilient Environmental Parameters Survey Using WSNs

190

Introduction

190

Model Architecture and Network Functioning

191

Tree Construction

192

Tree Maintenance and Convergence

192

Routing Tree

193

Nodes Querying

193

Automatic Rejoining

194

Data Integrity and Authenticity

195

Nodes Initialization

195

Data Collection and Hashchains

196

Capture-Resilience

198

Conclusion

198

References

199

SAVAH: Source Address Validation with Host Identity Protocol

200

Introduction

200

Background on Host Identity Protocol

201

Related Work

202

SAVAH Design and Implementation

202

SAVAH Architecture

203

SAVAH Router Discovery

203

Packet Authentication

205

Source Address Validation

206

Deployment and Integration with General SAVA Architecture

207

Performance Evaluation

208

Conclusions

210

References

210

Secure Service Invocation in a Peer-to-Peer Environment Using JXTA-SOAP

212

Introduction

212

Background

213

JXTA-SOAP

215

JXTA-SOAP for Java Standard Edition (J2SE)

216

JXTA-SOAP for Java Micro Edition (J2ME)

217

Secure Service Invocation

218

DefaultTLSTransport

218

DefaultWSSMessage

221

MIKEYPolicy for Mobile Applications

221

Conclusions

222

References

222

Security Aspects of Smart Cards vs. Embedded Security in Machine-to-Machine (M2M) Advanced Mobile Network Applications

224

Introduction

224

M2M Requirements

225

The Options for a TRE to Host Secure, Downloadable MCIMs

225

Smart Card Security in Mobile Networks: Why Is the Smart Card a Trusted Anchor?

227

Meeting M2M Requirements with UICCs

229

Security Analysis and Comparison: Can an Embedded TRE Ever Be as Secure as a Smart Card?

231

Conclusions

233

References

234

Simple Peer-to-Peer SIP Privacy

236

Introduction

236

Problem Scope

237

SolutionModel

238

Storage Key Obfuscation

239

Usability Considerations

240

Implementation

241

Technology

241

Prototype Overview

242

Privacy Enhancements

242

Evaluation

243

Discussion

245

Summary and Future Work

245

References

246

On Modeling Viral Diffusion in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks

248

Introduction

248

Related Works and Motivation

250

Modeling Disease with Heterogeneity of Nodes

251

Assumptions

251

Elaborate Models

252

Discussion on the Models

254

Assumption and Parameter Discussion

254

Analysis of Disease Extent

254

Simulation Results

255

Conclusions and Future Works

260

References

261

Mobile WiMAX Network Security

263

Introduction

263

WiMAX Network Architecture

263

Network Access Authentication

265

Authentication Scenarios

266

Subscription Authentication

267

Device Authentication and Subscription Provisioning

268

Key Management for Mobility Support

270

Summary and Outlook

273

References

274

LoPSiL: A Location-Based Policy-Specification Language

275

Introduction

275

LoPSiL

277

Core Linguistic Constructs

277

Example Policies

279

A LoPSiL Compiler

282

Compiler Architecture

282

Experiential Observations

284

Conclusions and Future Work

285

References

286

Impersonation Attacks on a Mobile Security Protocol for End-to-End Communications

288

Introduction

288

The LYH Mobile End-to-End Authentication and Secrecy Protocol

289

Certification Phase

289

Authentication Phase

291

Analyzing the LYH Protocol

292

Forging Certificates for the LYH Protocol

292

An Attack to Impersonate a Mobile User

293

An Attack to Impersonate a Base Station

294

Fixing the LYH Protocol

295

Using the Elgamal Signature Scheme in the LYH Protocol

295

Resistance of Fixed Protocol to the Presented Impersonation Attacks

295

Conclusions

296

References

296

Author Index

298